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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Aaron J. Campbell *
INTRODUCTION
This article surveys developments in Virginia criminal law and
procedure from June 2014 through June 2015. Of the many judi-
cial opinions and legislative enactments, the author has endeav-
ored to select those with the most impact on the practice of crimi-




In Howard v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether the defendant was improperly indicted when
the grand jury did not read the indictments aloud in open court.'
After the grand jury deliberated and returned to open court, it
presented the bills of indictment as "true bills," but did not read
them verbatim.2 A "true bill" becomes a valid indictment when it
is "presented in open court."8 The defendant argued he was not
properly indicted because, in his view, "presented in open court"
means "read aloud."4 The court of appeals rejected this interpre-
tation and concluded that "[r]eading the indictments aloud verba-
tim is not required for the indictment to be valid."' The court
* Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appeals Section, Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral, Commonwealth of Virginia. J.D., 2009, University of Richmond School of Law; B.A.,
2002, Concord University.
1. 63 Va. App. 580, 582-83, 760 S.E.2d 828, 828-29 (2014).
2. Id. at 582, 760 S.E.2d at 829.
3. Id. at 583, 760 S.E.2d at 829 (quoting Reed v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 471, 480,
706 S.E.2d 854, 859 (2011)).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 585, 760 S.E.2d at 830.
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found such a requirement unnecessary since the indictment is
read to the defendant at arraignment.6
In Holliday v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
decided whether the Commonwealth could bring additional
charges by direct indictment after the juvenile defendant had
been transferred to circuit court to be tried as an adult.' The de-
fendant was initially charged on juvenile petitions of first-degree
murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. After
holding a transfer hearing under Virginia Code section 16.1-
269.1(A), the juvenile court certified both charges to the circuit
court.9 Once in circuit court, the Commonwealth obtained direct
indictments on two conspiracy counts.° The defendant unsuccess-
fully moved to quash these additional indictments."
The defendant argued that Virginia Code section 16.1-269.1
prevents the Commonwealth from seeking a direct indictment in
circuit court without first proceeding in juvenile court, and since
the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction, the conspiracy
charges could not be brought in either court.'2 If accepted, the
"net effect" of the defendant's argument would require the Com-
monwealth to file all ancillary charges in juvenile court or be for-
ever barred from bringing those charges.2 However, the court of
appeals rejected this argument by first agreeing that the juvenile
court was divested of jurisdiction over any ancillary charges when
it certified the first-degree murder charge.4 Additionally, the
court stated that the General Assembly did not intend to create a
"jurisdictional vacuum" by foreclosing the Commonwealth from
going forward with ancillary charges once the defendant was to
be tried in circuit court as an adult." The court thus concluded,
6. See id.
7. 64 Va. App. 168, 169, 766 S.E.2d 742, 743 (2014).
8. Id.
9. See id. at 169-70, 766 S.E.2d at 743.
10. See id. at 169, 766 S.E.2d at 743.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 171, 766 S.E.2d at 744.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 172, 766 S.E.2d at 744.
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"the Code confers jurisdiction on the circuit court to proceed on
the murder charge and all ancillary charges."16
2. Joinder of Offenses
In Walker v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
held that the defendant's four drug distribution charges could not
be tried together because they failed to constitute a "common
plan" under Rule 3A:6(b)."' The charges stemmed from four pur-
chases of crack cocaine by an undercover police informant over
the course of thirteen days.s Prior to trial, the defendant unsuc-
cessfully moved to sever the charges into four trials.9 The Court
of Appeals of Virginia upheld the trial court's decision not to sev-
er, determining that the offenses constituted a "common plan
within the meaning of Rule 3A:6(b)."'2 The court of appeals ob-
served that each sale followed a similar pattern: the defendant
waited for the informant to contact him about buying crack co-
caine; the defendant set a location for the sale; each sale was for
approximately one gram; and all the sales took place in the same
general geographic area.21 The court of appeals also inferred that
the defendant provided a discount price on the drugs to "create a
return customer."22 According to the court of appeals, this consti-
tuted "a plan that tied the offenses together and demonstrated
that the object of each offense was to contribute to the achieve-
ment of a goal that was not obtainable by the commission of any
of the individual offenses."2
For several reasons, the supreme court reversed the court of
appeals.24 Notably, the supreme court was not persuaded the de-
fendant had "a particular 'goal not obtainable by the commission
16. Id.
17. 289 Va.____ 770 S.E.2d 197, 201 (2015).
18. See id. at __, 770 S.E.2d at 197-98.
19. Id. at__, 770 S. E.2d at 198.
20. Id. The court of appeals also found that justice did not require separate trials for
the purposes of Rule 3A:10(c). Id. The supreme court did not reach this second require-
ment for joinder of offenses. Id. at _, 770 S.E.2d at 201.
21. Id. at __, 770 S.E.2d at 198 (citing Walker v. Commonwealth, Record No. 1051-13-
2, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 112, at *9-10 (Mar. 25, 2014)).
22. Id. (quoting Walker, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 112, at *10).
23. Id. (quoting Walker, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 112, at *14).
24. Id. at, 770 S.E.2d at 201.
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of any of the individual offenses."'25 The court defined a "common
plan" as "a series of acts done with a relatively specific goal or
outcome in mind."26 The court explained that "[t]his goal or out-
come exists when the constituent offenses occur sequentially or
interdependently to advance some common, extrinsic objective,"
such as when a bank robber breaks into the bank president's
home, steals the keys to the bank, and then burglarizes the
bank.27 The court further noted that, "[t]he key factor.., is that
the goal furthered by the offences must be extrinsic to at least one
of them."28 This factor was absent in this case, the court conclud-
ed, because "[p]rofiting from the sale of drugs, including cultivat-
ing return customers, is intrinsic to the offense of selling drugs."29
3. Right to Counsel
The defendant in Brown v. Commonwealth argued that the tri-
al court "violated his Sixth Amendment rights by denying him a
continuance, on the day of trial, for the purported purpose of sub-
stituting court appointed counsel with retained counsel of his
choosing."3 At the start of the trial, the defendant's appointed
counsel informed the trial court that because of new employment
she would be unable to represent the defendant at any potential
sentencing hearing.31 Counsel told the trial court that the defend-
ant wanted to retain counsel rather than have his legal represen-
tation split up.32 The defendant, however, "presented no evidence
and made no proffer that his financial status had changed.33 The
trial court denied the continuance motion, stating that defense
25. Id. at -, 770 S.E.2d at 200 (quoting Spence v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1040,
1044, 407 S.E.2d 916, 918 (1991)). The supreme court was also not persuaded that the case
was distinguishable from Spence, nor was the court persuaded that the pattern of the
transactions was "sufficiently specific to establish an unusual and unifying modus operan-
di." Id. at __, 770 S. E.2d at 199-200.
26. Id. at __, 770 S.E.2d at 200 (quoting DAVID P. LEONARD, THE NEW WIGMORE: A
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE § 9.2.2., at 572 (2009)).
27. Id. at__ 770 S.E.2d at 200-01.
28. Id. at__ 770 S.E.2d at 201.
29. Id. The dissenting opinion was unwilling to say that the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in trying the four charges together. Id. (Kelsey, J., dissenting).
30. 288 Va. 439, 441, 764 S.E.2d 58, 59 (2014).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 442, 764 S.E.2d at 60.
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counsel was "very competent," and "it was not uncommon for a
")34different attorney to represent a defendant at sentencing ... 
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia observed that a de-
fendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel "does not guarantee
that an indigent defendant will receive representation by counsel
of his own choosing.3 5 Rather, "[t]he Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees a criminal defendant 'the right to be represented by an oth-
erwise qualified attorney whom that defendant can afford to hire,
or who is willing to represent the defendant even though he is
without funds."'36 "[T]he right to choice of counsel 'does not extend
to defendants who require [court appointed] counsel.'' 37 Here, by
not presenting evidence or making a proffer that his financial sta-
tus had changed, the defendant failed to establish he had a choice
of counsel.38 The court thus held that his "continuance request
was deficient, as a matter of law, because, when made, he estab-
lished no factual predicate for seeking substitution of other coun-
sel in place of his court appointed counsel under the authority of
the Sixth Amendment.39
B. Trial
1. Venue and Judicial Notice
In Williams v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
declined to infer that the trial court took judicial notice of the
crime's venue.4 ° At trial, an undercover Norfolk police officer testi-
fied that the defendant sold the officer cocaine." Because the of-
ficer never testified that the location of the sale was in the City of
Norfolk, defense counsel moved to strike based on a lack of ven-
ue.42 The prosecutor responded by arguing that the officer's testi-
mony was sufficient for the trial court to take judicial notice of
34. Id. at 441, 764 S.E.2d at 59-60.
35. Id. at 442, 764 S.E.2d at 60.
36. Id. (quoting Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-25
(1989)).
37. Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 151 (2006)).
38. See id.
39. Id. at 443, 764 S.E.2d at 61.
40. 289 Va -,... 771 S.E.2d 675, 677, 681 (2015).
41. Id. at __ 771 S.E.2d at 677.
42. Id.
20151
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venue.43 The trial court simply overruled the motion to strike
without commenting on the request o take judicial notice.44
The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that while the trial court
never explicitly stated it was taking judicial notice of the location
of the sale, it "can be safely inferred" the trial court took judicial
notice of that fact because it overruled the defendant's motion to
strike.45 The supreme court disagreed, pointing out that while "a
trial court may take 'judicial notice of geographical facts that are
matters of common knowledge, or shown by maps in common
use,"' the prosecutor never asked the trial court to do either.46 In-
stead, the prosecutor argued that the evidence already in the rec-
ord was sufficient for the trial court to find venue.47 The supreme
court was "unable to discern whether the trial court decided to
take judicial notice of the location of the offense, or whether the
trial court simply accepted the Commonwealth's sufficiency ar-
gument on the issue of venue . . . ."" Because the record did not
clearly reflect what action the trial court took, the supreme court
49held that the evidence was insufficient to prove venue.
2. Statute of Limitations for Lesser-Included Offenses
Taylor v. Commonwealth involved an issue of first impression
in Virginia: whether a defendant can be convicted of a lesser-
included offense that would have been time-barred if brought at
the time the prosecution commenced." At the conclusion of the
defendant's bench trial on a felony indictment, the trial court
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to convict her of that
crime, but there was sufficient evidence to convict her of a lesser-
included misdemeanor.5 The defendant maintained she could not
43. Id. at-, 771 S.E.2d at 677-78.
44. Id. at__, 771 S.E.2d at 678.
45. Id. (citing Williams v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 458, 466, 758 S.E.2d 553, 556-
57 (2014)).
46. Id. at -, 771 S.E.2d at 679 (quoting McClain v. Commonwealth, 189 Va. 847, 853,
55 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1949)).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. See id. at-, 771 S.E.2d at 679-81. In the dissent's opinion, the "trial court implic-
itly took judicial notice of venue by overruling [the] motion to strike .... Id. at __, 771
S.E.2d at 681 (Powell, J., dissenting).
50. See 64 Va. App. 282, 286, 767 S.E.2d 721, 723 (2015).
51. Id. at 284-85, 767 S.E.2d at 722-23.
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be convicted of the lesser charge because the one-year statute of
limitations for misdemeanors had run before her prosecution had
commenced.5' The Court of Appeals of Virginia agreed and joined
the overwhelming majority of courts that have concluded that one
cannot be convicted of a lesser-included offense upon a prosecu-
tion for the greater crime when the prosecution is commenced af-
ter the limitations period has run on the lesser offense.53
3. Testimony
In Turner v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
considered whether allowing a child victim of sexual battery to
write certain portions of her testimony violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right.4 Prior to trial, the
Commonwealth filed a motion in limine to allow the victim to
write portions of her testimony.55 The trial court granted the mo-
tion on the condition "that the Commonwealth attempt to elicit
an oral response from [the victim] before she would be allowed to
respond in writing."56 At trial, the victim responded in writing to
some of the questions about what had happened to her.57
The defendant argued "that the trial court's decision to allow
[the victim] to write portions of her testimony violated his rights
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.58 In
particular, the defendant argued that he was denied the right to
view the victim's demeanor as she wrote portions of her testimo-
ny.59 The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the record
showed the "[defendant], his counsel, and the trial judge retained
an uninhibited view of [the victim] throughout her testimony
.... ,,o The court explained that "while the Confrontation Clause
guarantees a right to observe an adverse witness' demeanor while
she is testifying, it does not guarantee the right to observe an ad-
verse witness' demeanor in whatever way, and to whatever ex-
52. Id. at 285, 767 S.E.2d at 723.
53. Id. at 285-87, 290, 767 S.E.2d at 723-24, 726.
54. See 63 Va. App. 401, 403, 758 S.E.2d 81, 82 (2014).
55. Id. at 404, 758 S.E.2d at 82.
56. Id., 758 S.E.2d at 83.
57. Id. at 405, 758 S.E.2d at 83.
58. Id. at 406-07, 758 S.E.2d at 84.
59. Id. at 407, 758 S.E.2d at 84.
60. Id. at 408, 758 S.E.2d at 84.
20151
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tent, a defendant prefers."'" It was enough that the defendant had
an uninhibited view of the witness during her testimony and was
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine her."2
4. Exclusion of Jurors
The Court of Appeals of Virginia clarified an "ancient rule" of
juror exclusion in Brown v. Commonwealth.3 Following lunch on
the first day of the defendant's trial, one of the regular jurors in-
formed the trial court that a young woman told the juror that her
grandparents lived down the street from the juror's house.6 4 The
juror, realizing that the young woman was with the defendant's
party, felt uneasy that the woman knew where she lived.5 The
prosecutor, out of concern that the juror may have been consider-
ing "things other than the law and the evidence," moved for the
trial court to excuse the juror for cause and replace her with an
alternate juror.66 Before deliberations, the trial court replaced the
juror with an alternate juror over the defendant's objection.67
On appeal, the defendant argued that even if there was rea-
sonable doubt as to the juror's impartiality, "by ancient rule, any
reasonable doubt as to a juror's qualifications must be resolved in
favor of the accused."6 The court of appeals found the defendant's
reliance on this "ancient rule" misplaced.69 As the court observed,
"the 'ancient rule' . . . has never provided an accused with the
ability to keep a juror whose impartiality can be reasonably ques-
tioned on the jury. ' Instead, "the original justification of the
rule, and its application in subsequent cases, demonstrate that
its purpose is to 'insure [a juror's] exclusion "from the jury when
there is a reasonable doubt about that juror's [impartiality]"
.... ,""' The defendant's argument failed because application of
61. Id. at 410, 758 S.E.2d at 85.
62. Id.
63. See 64 Va. App. 59, 65, 764 S.E.2d 297, 300 (2014).
64. Id. at 62, 764 S.E.2d at 298.
65. See id.
66. Id. at 62-63, 764 S.E.2d at 298.
67. Id. at 63-64, 764 S.E.2d at 299.
68. Id. at 65, 764 S.E.2d at 300 (quoting Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 117,
546 S.E.2d 446, 452 (2001)).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 66, 764 S.E.2d at 300 (emphasis added).
71. Id. (quoting Wright v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. (32 Gratt.) 941, 943-44 (1879)).
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the rule would result in dismissing the juror from the jury, not re-
taining her.72
5. Jury Instructions
In King v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
sitting en banc, found that the trial court erred in failing to
properly instruct the jury on the defense of accident.73 At trial, the
Commonwealth and the defendant presented two different ver-
sions of how the defendant shot her husband in the right fore-
arm.74 The husband testified he woke up to a gunshot and the de-
fendant with a gun in her hand.7" In contrast, the defendant
testified that the firearm discharged during a struggle with her
husband."6 Relying upon the defense of accident to her charge of
malicious wounding, the defendant proffered a jury instruction on
the accident defense.77 The trial court rejected the defendant's
proffered jury instruction because it reasoned that the other in-
structions adequately conveyed to the jury that malicious wound-
ing has to be an intentional act."
The court of appeals held that the defendant was entitled to
her requested jury instruction on the defense of accident "because
it was supported by more than a scintilla of the evidence and
would have legally entitled her to acquittal under the circum-
stances if believed by the jury."79 The court rejected the Com-
monwealth's argument that since the given instructions on malice
required an intentional act, the jury's verdict reflected a decision
that the defendant's actions were not accidental.8" The court of
appeals reasoned that "the risk of juror confusion would be
heightened if a jury were left to discern the legal principle of 'ac-
cident' by negative inference from the finding instruction covering
the elements of the offense."'"
72. Id. at 67, 764 S.E.2d at 300-01.
73. See 64 Va. App. 580, 583, 770 S.E.2d 214, 216 (2015).
74. Id. at 584, 770 S.E.2d at 216.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 584-85, 770 S.E.2d at 216-17.
77. Id. at 585, 770 S.E.2d at 217.
78. Id. at 586, 770 S.E.2d at 217.
79. Id. at 591, 770 S.E.2d at 220.
80. See id. at 588-89, 591-92, 770 S.E.2d at 218-20.
81. Id. at 591-92, 770 S.E.2d at 220.
2015]
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C. Sentencing
1. Deferred Dispositions
Recently, the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether
the trial court had authority to make a deferred disposition in
both Hernandez v. Commonwealth82 and Starrs v. Common-
wealth.83 In Harris v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of
Virginia addressed an issue not squarely addressed by Hernandez
or Starrs: the actual merits of a deferred disposition request.
8 4
During the defendant's bench trial for driving a motor vehicle af-
ter being declared a habitual offender, defense counsel asked the
trial court to take the case under advisement and refrain from
making a formal finding of guilt.85 The trial court denied the re-
86quest on the merits.
The defendant's argument on appeal addressed, in part,
whether "the trial court 'abused its discretion when it failed to
take the matter under advisement .. ,,," This argument differed
from Hernandez and Starrs because, as the court of appeals ex-
plained, those cases "determine how far into the trial proceedings
* . . a trial court's authority to defer a disposition extends," and
not whether the defendants' deferred disposition requests had
any merit.8 The court of appeals found no merit to the defend-
ant's request, characterizing it as "nothing more than a guilty de-
fendant's attempt to escape (or delay) an inevitable conviction
through judicial clemency."9 The court stressed that a trial
court's authority to defer a disposition does not give a trial court
the power of judicial clemency.9 ° Accordingly, the court of appeals
held that "a trial court's narrow authority to defer a disposition
does not in any way diminish its greater duty to render a timely
and lawful judgment that faithfully applies the relevant facts and
82. 281 Va. 222, 223, 707 S.E.2d 273, 273 (2011).
83. 287 Va. 1, 4, 752 S.E.2d 812, 814 (2014).
84. 63 Va. App. 525, 533, 759 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2014).
85. See id. at 527, 759 S.E.2d at 30.
86. Id. at 531, 759 S.E.2d at 32.
87. Id. at 532, 759 S.E.2d at 32.
88. Id. at 533, 759 S.E.2d at 33.
89. See id. at 536, 759 S.E.2d at 34.
90. See id.
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the controlling law."91 The court further declared that "a trial
court cannot simply acquit a defendant through an act of judicial
clemency (or judicial nullification), where the evidence proves the
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and where no statu-
tory authority exists to allow the trial court to dismiss the
charge."92
2. Mandatory Life Sentences for Juvenile Offenders
In 2012, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Miller
v. Alabama that a sentencing scheme mandating "life without pa-
role for those under the age of 18 at the time of their crimes vio-
lates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on 'cruel and unusual
punishments."'93 In Jones v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court
of Virginia took up whether Virginia's sentencing scheme for cap-
ital murder ran afoul of Miller.94 The supreme court concluded it
did not.95
When the defendant was seventeen years old, he pled guilty to
capital murder in exchange for a sentence of life without the pos-
sibility of parole.9" Twelve years later, the defendant sought to va-
cate his sentence on the basis that Miller applied retroactively to
his case.97 The supreme court never reached the issue of whether
Miller applied retroactively, ruling instead that Virginia's sen-
tencing scheme for capital murder did not actually impose a
mandatory minimum sentence of life without the possibility of
parole.9" The court held that, because a trial court has the ability
under Virginia Code section 19.2-303 to suspend part or all of the
life sentence imposed for a Class 1 felony conviction, the sentenc-
ing scheme was not a mandatory life without the possibility of pa-
role scheme.99 Thus, even if Miller did apply retroactively, the
court decided it did not affect Virginia's sentencing scheme."'
91. Id. at 536-37, 759 S.E.2d at 34.
92. Id. at 537, 759 S.E.2d at 34.
93. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012).
94. See 288 Va. 475, 477, 763 S.E.2d 823, 823 (2014).
95. See id.
96. Id. at 478, 763 S.E.2d at 824.
97. Id. at 477, 763 S.E.2d at 823.
98. See id. at 479, 763 S.E.2d at 824.
99. Id. at 480-81, 763 S.E.2d at 825-26.
100. Id. at 481, 763 S.E.2d at 826.
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3. Sentencing Verdicts
The Court of Appeals of Virginia reversed and remanded a pair
of cases for new sentencing hearings because of defective sentenc-
ing verdicts. In Webb v. Commonwealth, the jury's sentencing
verdict was defective because it was not unanimous.' When the
jury returned the sentencing verdict, defense counsel asked to
have the jury polled.102 During this polling, "[t]he clerk asked the
jury to 'answer yes if this is your verdict.""3 When calling the ju-
rors' names, one of the jurors answered, "[n]o."' 4 Neither the
judge nor the attorneys made any "response to the jury's lack of
unanimity. ' '
The defendant challenged his sentencing verdict on appeal, ar-
guing he was "entitled to a unanimous jury verdict at sentenc-
ing."106 The court of appeals agreed."7 The court looked to Virginia
Code section 19.2-295, which generally provides the defendant
"with a statutory right to have a jury ascertain his punishment
.... ,', The court then looked to Virginia Code section 19.2-295.1,
which states that "[i]f the jury cannot agree on a punishment,"
then a new sentencing hearing must be held either by a new jury,
or if the parties and the court agree, by the judge.0 9 Based
on these two statutes, the court concluded that the right to a
unanimous sentencing verdict is guaranteed by statute in Virgin-
ia. ' Because the defendant was deprived of this right, the court
held that a "miscarriage of justice occurred" and remanded the
case for a new sentencing hearing."'
In Commonwealth v. Greer, the court of appeals found the sen-
tencing verdict defective because the jury refused to sentence the
101. See 64 Va. App. 371, 374, 768 S.E.2d 696, 697-98 (2015).




106. Id. at 374-75, 768 S.E.2d at 698.
107. Id. at 379, 768 S.E.2d at 700.
108. Id. at 376, 768 S.E.2d at 699.
109. Id. at 377-78, 768 S.E.2d at 699 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-295.1 (Cum. Supp.
2015)); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-257 (Repl. Vol. 2008 & Cum. Supp. 2015) (allowing
the judge to preside over the new sentencing hearing if the parties and the court agree).
110. See id. at 377-79, 768 S.E.2d at 699-700.
111. Id. at 379, 768 S.E.2d at 700.
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defendant in accordance with the law.'12 The jury convicted the
defendant of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a
violent felony, which requires a mandatory minimum sentence of
five years."3 Despite being instructed about the five-year manda-
tory minimum sentence, the jury returned with a verdict of two
years."4 The Commonwealth sought to set aside the sentencing
verdict and impanel a new jury, but the trial court denied the re-
quest." 5 The court of appeals reversed, holding that "the jury's
sentence of two years was erroneous and the trial court's imposi-
tion of that sentence was void ab initio.....6 The court of appeals
stressed that "[o]nce guilt has been determined, both judge and
jury are constrained by the sentencing limits set by the legisla-
ture."'' 7 Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the trial judge
"was obligated to reject the jury's verdict and to impanel a new
jury to determine punishment within the limits established by
the legislature ....
4. Probation Terms
In Murry v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered the reasonableness of "a probation condition requiring
[the defendant] to submit to warrantless, suspicionless searches
of his person, property, residence, and vehicle at any time by any
probation or law enforcement officer."" 9 The circuit court convict-
ed the defendant of a number of sexual offenses against his step-
daughter.'2 ° The court imposed the probation condition, and over-
ruled the defendant's objection to it, because it concluded that the
defendant had groomed his victim from an early age and had suc-
cessfully concealed his behavior from his family and the commu-
nity for many years.'2' The court wanted "law enforcement to have
112. 63 Va. App. 561, 564, 760 S.E.2d 132, 133 (2014).
113. Id. at 565, 760 S.E.2d at 134.
114. Id. at 565-66, 760 S.E.2d at 134.
115. Id. at 567, 760 S.E.2d at 134-35.
116. Id. at 569, 760 S.E.2d at 135.
117. Id. at 572, 760 S.E.2d at 137.
118. Id. at 579, 760 S.E.2d at 140-41.
119. See 288 Va. 117, 120, 762 S.E.2d 573, 575 (2014).
120. Id.
121. See id. at 121, 762 S.E.2d at 575.
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the ability to go directly into his house at any time to see what
he's doing."'22
The supreme court found the probation condition unreasonable
in light of the nature of the offense, the defendant's background,
and the surrounding circumstances.'23 In doing so, the court ap-
plied a balancing test weighing the probationer's expectation of
privacy against the government's interest in rehabilitation and
protection of society."' On the defendant's side of the balance, the
court noted that "probationers retain some expectation of privacy,
albeit diminished."'25 In this case, the probation condition im-
posed a significant degree of intrusion on the defendant's expecta-
tion of privacy as a probationer; in fact, it extinguished any
Fourth Amendment rights the defendant may have had as a pro-
bationer.'26 On the other side of the balance, the court noted that
"the Commonwealth has a legitimate interest in ensuring that
[the defendant] completes a meaningful period of rehabilitation
and that society not be harmed by [the defendant] being at large
as a sex offender .... ,,127 The court, however, concluded those in-





In Mason v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
reheard the case en banc, and in a closely divided decision, held
that a police officer had reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop
when the officer pulled over a motorist for an "opaque parking
pass measuring five inches long and three inches wide" hanging
from a rear-view mirror.'29 Prior to trial, the defendant sought to
suppress evidence from the traffic stop, arguing that it was un-
122. Id.
123. Id. at 130, 762 S.E.2d at 581.
124. Id. at 123-25, 762 S.E.2d at 577-78. The court applied the framework established
in United States v. Knights. Id. (citing United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001)).
125. Id. at 126, 762 S.E.2d at 578.
126. Id. at 126-27, 762 S.E.2d at 579.
127. Id. at 127, 762 S.E.2d at 580.
128. Id.
129. See 64 Va. App. 292, 295-97, 767 S.E.2d 726, 728-29 (2015).
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constitutional.3 ' At the suppression hearing, the police officer tes-
tified he saw the "dangling object" hanging from the rearview
mirror and believed he had the right to pull over the vehicle
based on Virginia Code section 46.2-1054, which prohibits any ob-
ject from being "suspended from any part of the motor vehicle in
such a manner as to obstruct the driver's clear view of the high-
way through the windshield, the front side windows, or the rear
window."3 ' The trial court ruled that a reasonable officer could
suspect that the parking pass dangling from a rearview mirror
might violate section 46.2-1054.132
In upholding the trial court's denial of the suppression motion,
the court of appeals rejected the defendant's contention "that an
officer making an investigatory stop must actually articulate,
from the witness stand, the articulable facts and then explain, in
his personal opinion, why these facts prompted him to be suspi-
cious.""13 The court went on to explain in depth why a reasonable
officer could suspect that the parking pass blocked the driver's
field of vision of the roadway.13 ' The court emphasized its holding
"does not endorse any per se rule authorizing traffic stops when-
ever an object of any kind is observed dangling from a vehicle's
rearview mirror. , 13' For example, the court suggested if the object
were a "high school graduation tassel or a tiny chain locket" the
outcome would be different.'36 But for the object in this case-a
five-by-three-inch opaque parking pass hanging from a rearview
mirror of a sedan-the court concluded the stop was justified.'37
130. Id. at 295, 767 S.E.2d at 728.
131. Id. at 297-28, 767 S.E.2d at 729-30 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 46.2-1054 (Repl.
Vol. 2013 & Cum. Supp. 2015)).
132. See id. at 300, 767 S.E.2d at 730.
133. Id. at 303, 767 S.E.2d at 732.
134. See id. at 305-06, 767 S.E.2d at 733.
135. Id. at 307, 767 S.E.2d at 734.
136. Id. at 308, 767 S.E.2d at 734-35.
137. Id. at 307, 767 S.E.2d at 734. The dissent would have reversed the case for two
reasons: (1) the officer's failure to investigate the existence of the alleged criminal activity
and (2) the officer's testimony articulated no facts from which one could infer reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity. Id. at 312, 767 S.E.2d at 736 (Humphreys, J., dissenting).
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B. Specific Crimes
1. Burglary
In Grimes v. Commonwealth, the defendant stole copper pipe
from the crawl space underneath a house.138 The question before
the Supreme Court of Virginia was whether the defendant en-
tered a "dwelling house" for purposes of statutory burglary under
Virginia Code section 18.2-91.139 The defendant maintained that
he did not actually break into a dwelling house, but rather went
underneath it.' The defendant argued the crawl space did not
constitute part of the dwelling house because there was no access
between the crawl space and the remaining portion of the house,
and because the crawl space was not suitable for habitation.'
The supreme court concluded that the crawl space was "struc-
turally part of the house."' 2 The court reasoned that "[i]t is physi-
cally contained within the four exterior walls, i.e., the vertical
plane, of the house; it is under the same roof; and it contains in-
tegral utilities, such as plumbing and ductwork, that are needed
in a dwelling house."'4 3 Accordingly, the court determined that
"when an area of a house is 'functionally interconnected with and
immediately contiguous to other portions of the house,' it consti-
tutes part of the dwelling house."'4
2. Child Pornography
In Kelley v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered an argument that the defendant did not distribute
child pornography over the internet using peer-to-peer software
but rather merely downloaded it.' According to the defendant,
"the evidence was insufficient to prove distribution because the
peer-to-peer software he used to access and download child por-
nography automatically placed the child pornography files into a
138. 288 Va. 314, 316, 764 S.E.2d 262, 263 (2014).
139. Id. at 318, 764 S.E.2d at 264.
140. Id. at 316, 764 S.E.2d at 263.
141. Id. at 318, 764 S.E.2d at 264-65.
142. Id. at 318, 764 S.E.2d at 265.
143. Id.
144. Id. (quoting Burgett v. State, 314 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)).
145. See Kelley v. Commonwealth, 289 Va_ __ 771 S.E.2d. 672, 672-73 (2015).
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shared folder accessible to other users of the software.'46 The su-
preme court disagreed, concluding that the defendant distributed
child pornography when he downloaded the files into his shared
folder where anyone, including law enforcement, could access it.
147
The defendant could have prevented others from downloading
those files by changing the settings on his computer, but he did
not do so.'48 Thus, in the court's opinion, it did not matter whether
the defendant's shared folder containing the child pornography
was created as a default option by the software.
149
3. Counterfeit Currency
In Hawkins v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered "the sufficiency of the evidence required to support a
conviction for possession of counterfeit currency in violation of
[Virginia] Code § 18.2-173.'' '50 Here, the police went to a pool hall
to find and arrest the defendant on several outstanding war-
rants.' As the officers approached the defendant, he "put his
right hand into the right pocket of his shorts."'52 An officer drew
his weapon and ordered the defendant to remove his hand from
his pocket.'53 The defendant removed his hand and threw a "large
sum of money" on the floor.14 The defendant insisted the money,
which turned out to be counterfeit, did not belong to him."'
Under Virginia Code section 18.2-173, the Commonwealth
must prove the defendant possessed the forged bills, knew they
were forged, and had the intent to utter or employ them as true.
The supreme court held that all three requirements were satis-
fied in this case."7 As for possession of the bills, the supreme
court upheld the trial court's finding that officers saw the defend-
146. Id. at-, 771 S.E.2d at 672-73.
147. Id. at 771 S.E.2d at 674-75.
148. Id. at__, 771 S.E.2d at 675.
149. See id. at __, 771 S.E.2d at 675.




154. Id. at 485, 764 S.E.2d at 83.
155. Id.
156. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-173 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2015)).
157. See id. at 486-87, 764 S.E.2d at 83-84.
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ant holding the bills.'58 With regards to whether the defendant
knew the bills were counterfeit, the supreme court stated the trial
court could reasonably infer the defendant's guilty knowledge
from his attempt to abandon the counterfeit money when the po-
lice approached him.19 Lastly, as to whether the defendant in-
tended to utter the forged bills, the court relied upon several cir-
cumstances that the federal courts have held will support a
finding of the requisite intent: "possession of a large number of
counterfeit bills; taking counterfeit bills to a commercial estab-
lishment, where cash transactions are likely [such as a pool hall];
and segregating counterfeit bills from genuine currency.'
°6 0
4. Distribution of Imitation Controlled Substances
In Powell v. Commonwealth, the Supreme Court of Virginia
considered whether sufficient evidence existed to "sustain a con-
viction for distribution of an imitation Schedule I or II controlled
substance where the substance actually distributed was a Sched-
ule VI controlled substance."16' The defendant sold an undercover
police officer a clear plastic baggie containing a "white rock[-like]
substance" that resembled crack cocaine.' The substance was ac-
tually half of a quetiapine pill.' Quetiapine is a Schedule VI con-
trolled substance under Virginia's Drug Control Act.
6 4
To be convicted of distributing an imitation controlled sub-
stance under code section 18.2-247(B), the substance cannot be a
controlled substance subject to abuse.'65 Since quetiapine is a
controlled substance, the issue for the supreme court was wheth-
er quetiapine is "subject to abuse."'66 The court looked to the lan-
guage of the Drug Control Act and observed that, unlike con-
158. Id. at 486, 764 S.E.2d at 83.
159. See id. at 486-87, 764 S.E.2d at 84 (citing Ruiz v. United States, 374 F.2d 619, 620
(5th Cir. 1967) ("Probably the strongest evidence of guilty knowledge is an attempt to
abandon counterfeit currency when detection is feared.")).
160. Id. at 487, 764 S.E.2d at 84 (internal citations omitted).
161. 289 Va. 20, 22, 766 S.E.2d 736, 737 (2015).
162. Id. at 23, 766 S.E.2d at 737.
163. Id. at 23-24, 766 S.E.2d at 737.
164. Id. at 23, 27, 766 S.E.2d at 737, 739 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-3455(2) (Repl.
Vol. 2013 & Cum. Supp. 2015)).
165. Id. at 26, 766 S.E.2d at 739 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. 18.247(B)(ii) (Repl. Vol. 2014
& Cum. Supp. 2015)).
166. Id. at 29, 766 S.E.2d at 741.
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trolled substances under Schedules I-V, Schedule VI substances
do not include the factor of "potential for abuse."'167 Based on the
absence of this language in Schedule VI, the court concluded that
quetiapine "is not a controlled substance subject to abuse as de-
fined by the Drug Control Act." '168 The court therefore upheld the
defendant's conviction of selling an imitation controlled sub-
stance.
169
5. Driving Under the Influence
The Supreme Court of Virginia continues to define the parame-
ters of what constitutes driving under the influence ("DUI") in vi-
olation of Virginia Code section 18.2-266. In Sarafin v. Common-
wealth, a majority of the court upheld the defendant's DUI
conviction when the defendant was intoxicated while sitting be-
hind the wheel of a vehicle parked in his private driveway with
the keys in the ignition.' In recent years, the court has held that
a defendant operates a vehicle for purposes of Code section 18.2-
266 when the vehicle is parked with the key in the ignition. '
However, until now the court had not definitively decided
"whether Code § 18.2-266 is violated when the operation of the
vehicle occurs on a private way."'7 2
Examining the plain language of code section 18.2-266, the su-
preme court decided there is no explicit "on a highway" require-
ment to DUI.'73 As the court observed, the statute applies equally
to motor vehicles, engines, and trains.'74 Since trains are operated
on privately-owned tracks, the court reasoned that reading in a
public highway requirement would effectively read engines or
167. Id., 766 S.E.2d at 740.
168. Id. at 29-30, 766 S.E.2d at 740-41.
169. Id. at 31, 766 S.E.2d at 741.
170. 288 Va. 320, 322, 331, 764 S.E.2d 71, 72, 77 (2014).
171. See Enriquez v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 511, 516-17, 722 S.E.2d 252, 255 (2012);
Nelson v. Commonwealth, 281 Va. 212, 219, 707 S.E.2d 815, 818 (2011).
172. Sarafin, 288 Va. at 327, 764 S.E.2d at 75.
173. Id. at 327-28, 764 S.E.2d at 75.
174. Id., 764 S.E.2d at 76.
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trains out of the statute, or require the court to carve out a "pri-
vate way" exception for motor vehicles."5 The court refused to do
either.17
6. Felony Eluding
In Jones v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
decided whether the defendant committed felony eluding in viola-
tion of Virginia Code section 46.2-817(B).1 7 Here, the police initi-
ated a traffic stop for a possible DUI. 17 After the police activated
the emergency lights and sirens, the defendant stopped the vehi-
cle in a parking lot of a 7-Eleven.'79 One officer approached the
driver's side; another officer approached the passenger side.8 ° The
officer on the driver's side asked for license and registration, but
the defendant did not respond.' The officer then asked the de-
fendant to remove the keys from the ignition and hand them to
him.8 ' The defendant removed the keys but kept them in his
hand.' The passenger said to the defendant, "[j]ust go." ' The of-
ficer then reached into the vehicle to try to get the keys, but be-
fore he could grab them, the defendant drove away from the sce-
ne."'85 Both officers were partially inside the vehicle and were only
able to break free just as the vehicle sped out of the parking lot.'88
On appeal, the defendant argued he could not be convicted of
felony eluding under Virginia Code section 46.2-817(B) because
he initially stopped by pulling the vehicle into the parking lot of
175. Id. at 328-29, 764 S.E.2d at 76.
176. Id. Two justices authored dissenting opinions. Justice Mims wrote that "the Court
has taken the final step toward construing Code § 18.2-266 to punish a person for merely
occupying, rather than operating, a motor vehicle." Id. at 334, 764 S.E.2d at 79 (Mims, J.,
dissenting). Justice McClanahan wrote that the majority had "jettison[ed] the half-
century-old highway requirement in the DUI statute . Id. (McClanahan, J., dissent-
ing).
177. 64 Va. App. 361, 363, 768 S.E.2d 270, 271 (2015).
178. Id. at 363-64, 768 S.E.2d at 271.






185. Id. at 364, 768 S.E.2d at 271-72.
186. Id. at 364-65, 768 S.E.2d at 272.
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the 7-Eleven.8 7 According to the defendant, "the fact that he 'sub-
sequently placed the keys in the ignition and sped away does not
trigger Section 46.2-817(B),' since '[s]ection (B) prohibits escaping
or eluding police officers only in disregard to a signal to stop a
motor vehicle.""88 The court of appeals found that this argument
overlooked the evidence that the defendant drove the vehicle "in a
willful and wanton disregard of subsequent signals to stop.'8 9
Both officers reached into the vehicle in an effort to retrieve the
keys while the defendant continued to speed out of the parking
lot. 190 Thus, the court concluded that a rational trier of fact could
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant drove the mo-




In Holley v. Commonwealth, the trial court found the defendant
guilty of both first-degree felony murder and second-degree mur-
der in the killing of a man during an armed burglary."' The Court
of Appeals of Virginia, sitting en banc, unanimously held that
"the Double Jeopardy Clause precludes a conviction and punish-
ment for both second-degree murder and first-degree felony mur-
der when there is only one victim."'93 The court explained that
"under the common law of homicide, the units of prosecution are
dead bodies, not theories of aggravation."'94 Thus, under the
common law, the defendant could not be convicted of two murders
for one killing. 9' The court rejected the Commonwealth's position
that the enactment of the felony-murder statute, Virginia Code
section 18.2-32, had displaced the common law.9 The court con-
cluded that by enacting the felony murder statute, "the General
Assembly did not intend to displace the common law's conception
of homicide as a unitary crime with regard to murder and felony
187. Id. at 366, 768 S.E.2d at 273.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 369, 768 S.E.2d at 274.
190. Id.
191. See id.
192. 64 Va. App. 156, 159, 765 S.E.2d 873, 874 (2014).
193. Id. at 158, 765 S.E.2d at 874.
194. Id. at 161, 765 S.E.2d at 875.
195. Id.
196. See id. at 161, 164, 765 S.E.2d at 875, 877.
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murder;" rather, "the provision was enacted to mitigate the
harshness of the common law's punishment for the crime of homi-
cide."'97 Because the defendant could not be convicted of first-
degree felony murder and second-degree murder of the same per-
son, the court reversed his lesser convictions of second-degree
murder and use of a firearm in the commission of second-degree
murder.'98
8. Resisting Arrest
In Joseph v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
held that the crime commonly known as "resisting arrest" re-
quires more than just resistance.199 During a traffic stop, a police
officer determined the defendant had outstanding warrants.'00 As
the officer went to search the defendant, he "backed up on to [sic]
the officer."'' The officer tried to get the defendant to place his
hands behind his back and handcuff him, but the defendant re-
peatedly pulled away and repelled the officer's efforts to handcuff
him.0 2 The defendant, however, "'did not leave the scene' and re-
mained 'continuously in ... close proximity' to the officer
throughout the encounter.2 '
On appeal, the parties and the court of appeals agreed the evi-
dence was insufficient to support the defendant's conviction for
resisting arrest since he never fled from the officer.2 4 Under the
resisting arrest statute, Virginia Code section 18.2-479.1(B), the
Commonwealth must prove a defendant who is "intentionally
preventing or attempting to prevent a lawful arrest is specifically
doing so by fleeing from the officer."20 5 The court applied the plain
meaning of the word "flee" and held that "fleeing from a law en-
forcement officer requires a form of running away or physically
departing from the officer's immediate span of control.2 6 Thus,
197. Id. at 164, 765 S.E.2d at 877.
198. Id. at 166-67, 765 S.E.2d at 878.
199. See 64 Va. App. 332, 333, 768 S.E.2d 256, 256 (2015).
200. Id. at 334, 768 S.E.2d at 257.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 334-35, 768 S.E.2d at 257.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 336, 768 S.E.2d at 257-58.
205. Id. at 337-38, 768 S.E.2d at 258.
206. Id. at 339, 768 S.E.2d at 259.
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although the defendant demonstrated resistance and repeated ef-
forts to avoid physical custody, no evidence of flight existed to
support a conviction under Virginia Code section 18.2-479.1(B).2 °7
9. Robbery
In Fagan v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virginia
determined whether the defendant committed larceny by trick or
robbery when he took a victim's property while impersonating a
police officer.2°0 The defendant and an accomplice pulled over a
vehicle using a blue light.2"9 The defendant tapped on the window
of the vehicle with a sheathed knife and said "undercover.""21 The
defendant ordered the occupants out of the car and told them to
place their hands on the trunk of the car.21' The "officers" then
frisked the occupants and subsequently took their phones and
wallets .212
The appeal focused on the victim who testified that he did not
know the men were not police officers until they drove away."3
The defendant argued that he could be guilty of larceny by trick,
but not robbery, of this victim.' The court of appeals disagreed,
explaining that "[t]he threat of violence is what distinguishes lar-
ceny from robbery."'215 Thus, the dispositive question was not
whether the victim was taken in by the defendant's ruse, but ra-
ther whether the evidence supports the jury's conclusion that the
defendant took the victim's property by intimidation."' The court
held that there was sufficient evidence such that a rational juror
could find the victim unwillingly parted with his property because
207. See id. at 339-40, 768 S.E.2d at 259.
208. See 63 Va. App. 395, 396-97, 758 S.E.2d 78, 79 (2014).
209. Id. at 396, 758 S.E.2d at 79.
210. Id. at 396-97, 758 S.E.2d at 79.




215. See id. at 398, 400, 758 S.E.2d at 80-81.
216. Id. at 400, 758 S.E.2d at 80.
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of the defendant's intimidation.217 The court identified, in particu-
lar, the defendant's tapping the handle of a sheathed knife on the
window as "an unmistakable gesture of intimidation.""21
In Adeniran v. Commonwealth, the Court of Appeals of Virgin-
ia held that assault is not a lesser-included offense of robbery or
attempted robbery.219 The defendant was convicted of attempted
robbery of a prostitute.22 ° On appeal, he argued that the trial
court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that simple assault is
a lesser-included offense of both robbery and attempted rob-
bery.221 The court of appeals found no error in refusing the in-
struction because not every robbery necessarily includes an as-
sault.2 It reasoned that, because the common law crime of
assault "requires an overt act, words alone are never sufficient to
constitute an assault.""22 By contrast, "words alone can create suf-
ficient intimidation . . . to sustain a conviction of robbery.224
Therefore, "[blecause assault contains an element that robbery
does not," the court held that "assault cannot be a lesser-included
offense of robbery.225
10. Sodomy
Toghill v. Commonwealth involved the continued disagreement
between state and federal courts over the constitutionality of the
anti-sodomy provisions of former Virginia Code section 18.2-
361(A).226 In 2013, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit ruled that the statute was facially unconstitution-
al under the decision from the Supreme Court of the United
217. Id. at 400, 758 S.E.2d at 81.
218. See id. at 400, 758 S.E.2d at 80-81.
219. See 63 Va. App. 617, 619-20, 761 S.E.2d 782, 783 (2014).
220. Id.
221. Id. at 621, 761 S.E.2d at 784.
222. Id. at 624-25, 761 S.E.2d at 785.
223. Id. at 624, 761 S.E.2d at 785 (quoting Clark v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 636, 641,
691 S.E.2d 786, 789 (2010)).
224. Id. (citing Bivins v. Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 750, 752, 454 S.E.2d 741, 742
(1995)).
225. Id. at 624-25, 761 S.E.2d at 785
226. See 289 Va. 220, 224, 768 S.E.2d 674, 675 (2015). The 2014 General Assembly
amended Virginia Code section 18.2-361(A) to remove the general provisions forbidding
sodomy. See Act of Apr. 23, 2014, ch. 794, 2014 Va. Acts _, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2015)).
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States in Lawrence v. Texas.2 7 This decision ran directly counter
to a previous ruling by the Supreme Court of Virginia that the
statute was constitutional as applied to sodomy cases involving
228an adult with a minor.
In Toghill, the supreme court disagreed with t e Fourth Cir-
cuit and once again ruled that the statute was constitutional.29 In
doing so, the court identified "limiting language" in Lawrence
that "simply does not afford adults with the constitutional right
to engage in sodomy with minors.,23" Because the defendant solic-
ited sodomy with a person whom he thought was a minor, the
court found he lacked standing to assert a facial challenge to the




In Dawson v. Commonwealth, the defendant was convicted of
the recently enacted crime of strangulation, found in Virginia
Code section 18.2-51.6."'5 The evidence at trial showed that the
defendant had applied pressure to the victim's neck, impeding her
breathing and leaving bruises on her neck.233 The Court of Ap-
peals of Virginia considered whether the defendant caused a
"wounding" or "bodily injury" to the victim. 23' Because the statute
did not define either term, the court looked to how the terms had
been defined elsewhere in the Virginia Code-in particular, the
malicious wounding statute.235 To prove the victim had been
wounded, the court determined that "the Commonwealth must
show that the victim's skin was broken or cut. '236 Since the vic-
tim's cuts were not caused by the defendant's act of strangulation,
the court of appeals next considered whether the evidence was
227. MacDonald v. Moose, 710 F.3d 154, 156, 162, 167 (4th Cir. 2013).
228. McDonald v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 249, 260, 645 S.E.2d 918, 924 (2007).
229. Toghill, 289 Va. at 231-32, 768 S.E.2d at 680.
230. Id. at 229-30, 768 S.E.2d at 679.
231. Id. at 231, 768 S.E.2d at 680.
232. 63 Va. App. 429, 433-34, 758 S.E.2d 94, 97 (2014).
233. Id. at 431-33, 758 S.E.2d at 96.
234. Id. at 434, 758 S.E.2d at 97.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 435, 758 S.E.2d at 97 (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 303,
317, 709 S.E.2d 175, 182 (2011)).
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sufficient to show the victim suffered "bodily injury.""7 As it has
done in other cases, the court interpreted "bodily injury" to mean
"any bodily hurt whatsoever.""23 The court concluded that the
bruises around the victim's neck constituted a bodily injury that
resulted from the defendant applying pressure to her neck.239
III. LEGISLATION
A. Affirmative Defenses
To combat drug and alcohol overdose fatalities, the 2015 Gen-
eral Assembly passed a "safe reporting" law that creates an af-
firmative defense to certain drug and alcohol related offenses if
the defendant, in good faith, seeks or obtains emergency medical
attention for an overdose incurred either personally or by anoth-
er.24 The affirmative defense may be applied to the following of-
fenses: unlawful possession, purchase, or consumption of alcohol;
possession of a controlled substance; possession of marijuana; in-
toxication in public; or possession of controlled paraphernalia.241
To invoke the affirmative defense, the defendant must: remain at
the scene of the overdose or the location where the overdose vic-
tim is transferred to for medical attention until law enforcement
arrives; identify himself to law enforcement; and cooperate with a
criminal investigation, if requested.2"2 The affirmative defense,
however, cannot be asserted if medical attention was sought dur-
ing execution of a search warrant or during a lawful search or ar-
rest.
2 43
The 2015 General Assembly also created a limited medical ma-
rijuana affirmative defense for patients with intractable epilep-
237. Id.
238. Id. (quoting Luck v. Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 827, 831, 531 S.E.2d 41, 43
(2000)).
239. Id. at 437, 758 S.E.2d at 98. It should be noted that the Supreme Court of Virginia
has granted an appeal in another case where one issue is whether the court of appeals
erred in finding that there was no bodily injury where the victim was choked until she was
unconscious. Chilton v. Commonwealth, No. 1531-13-3, 2014 Va. App. LEXIS 379 (Va. Ct.
App. Nov. 18, 2014), cert. granted, No. 141820, 2015 Va. LEXIS 39 (Va. Apr. 7, 2015).
240. Act of Mar. 23, 2015, ch. 436, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-251.03 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
241. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-251.03(B) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
242. Id. § 18.2-251.03(B)(2)-(4) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
243. Id. § 18.2-251.03(C) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
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sy.2" Under the law, written certification from a doctor will serve
as an affirmative defense for epilepsy patients arrested and




In 2013, the General Assembly placed a two-year moratorium
on law enforcement use of "unmanned aircraft systems," i.e.,
drones.2"6 The 2015 General Assembly replaced the moratorium
with a law prohibiting the use of unmanned aircraft systems by
law enforcement without a warrant.247 Any evidence obtained in
violation of the law is not admissible in any criminal or civil pro-
ceeding.'4 Law enforcement may use unmanned aircraft systems
without a warrant under the following exceptions: during a
search under Amber, Senior, and Blue alerts; when necessary to
alleviate immediate danger to a person; for training exercises re-
lated to such uses; or if a person with legal authority consents to
the warrantless search.249 The law does not ban the use of un-
manned aircraft systems for non-law enforcement related gov-
ernment purposes such as traffic, flood, or fire assessment.20 The
law also does not ban private, commercial, recreational, or educa-
tional use of unmanned aircraft systems.25 ' Weaponized un-
manned aircraft systems, however, are banned except for certain
military training.
5 2
C. Enticing Another Person into a Dwelling House with Intent to
Commit Certain Felonies
The 2015 General Assembly created the new crime of enticing
another person into a dwelling house with intent to commit cer-
244. Act of Feb. 26, 2015, ch. 7, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 18.2-250.1 (Cum. Supp. 2015); codified at id. § 54.1-3408.3 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
245. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 18.2-250.1, 54.1-3408.3 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
246. Act of Apr. 3, 2013, ch. 796, 2013 Va. Acts 1645.
247. Act of Apr. 30, 2015, ch. 764, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
19.2-60.1 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
248. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-60.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
249. Id. § 19.2-60.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
250. Id. § 19.2-60.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
251. Id.
252. Id. § 19.2-60.1(F)-(G) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
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tain felonies."' There are two general requirements to the crime:
(1) the person commits murder, abduction, aggravated malicious
wounding, robbery, rape, forcible sodomy, or object sexual pene-
tration within a dwelling house and (2) that person with the in-
tent to commit one of those felonies enticed, solicited, requested,
or otherwise caused the victim to enter such dwelling house."4
D. "Palcohol"Ban
The federal government recently cleared the sale of "palcohol,"
a powder that can turn a glass of water into an alcoholic drink.2 6
The 2015 General Assembly, however, banned that product in
Virginia. 6' Under the new law, no container sold in or shipped in-
to Virginia shall include powder or crystalline alcohol.27 Addi-
tionally, the possession, sale, purchase, or use of powdered or
crystalline alcohol shall be a Class 1 misdemeanor.6 8
E. Commercial Sex Trafficking
The 2015 General Assembly passed Virginia's first commercial
sex trafficking law.9 Under subsection (A) of the newly created
Virginia Code section 18.2-357.1, any person who "solicits, in-
vites, recruits, encourages, or otherwise causes or attempts to
cause a person to" engage in prostitution "with the intent to re-
ceive money or other valuable thing or to assist another in receiv-
ing money or other valuable thing from the earnings" of the solic-
ited person from an act of prostitution is guilty of a Class 5
felony.26° Additionally, "any person who violates subsection (A)
253. Act of Mar. 23, 2015, ch. 392, 2015 Va. Acts __ - (codified at VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-50.3 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
254. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.20-50.3 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
255. "Palcohol" Powdered Alcohol Wins Federal Approval, CBSNEws (Mar. 11,
2015, 8:27 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/palcohol-powdered-alcohol-wins-federal-
approval/.
256. Act of Apr. 15, 2015, ch. 735, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 4.1-100, .103 (Cum. Supp. 2015); codified at id. § 4.1-302.2 (Cum. Supp.
2015)).
257. VA. CODE ANN. § 4.1-103.19 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
258. Id. § 4.1-302.2 (Cum. Supp. 2015).
259. See Act of Mar. 27, 2015, ch. 690, 2015 Va. Acts __, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-902, 17.1-805, 18.2-46.1, 18.2-356, 18.2-357, 18.2-513, 19.2-215.1, 19.2-
386.35 (Cum. Supp. 2015); codified at id. § 18.2-357.1 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
260. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-357.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
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through the use of force, intimidation, or deception is guilty of a
Class 4 felony.,261' Finally, any adult who violates subsection (A)
with an underage person is guilty of a Class 3 felony."'
The General Assembly added commercial sex trafficking to the
definition of a violent felony for the purposes of the sentencing
guidelines, predicate criminal acts for street gangs, Virginia's
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization ("RICO") Act,
multi-jurisdiction grand jury, asset forfeiture, and the Sex Of-
fender Registry.263 The legislation also amended two existing Vir-
ginia Code sections on receiving money for procuring a person for
prostitution and receiving money from the earnings of a person
engaged in prostitution."' If those crimes involved a minor, then
the penalty is increased from a Class 4 felony to a Class 3 felo-
265ny.
F. Venue
Under the 2015 General Assembly amendments to the criminal
venue statute, if an offense has occurred in Virginia and venue
cannot be readily determined, then venue may be had in the
county or city in Virginia in which the defendant resides, where a
non-resident defendant is apprehended, or where a related of-
fense was committed if the defendant is a non-resident and is ap-
prehended outside Virginia.66 Venue for homicide cases was ex-
panded to include the city or county where any part of the body
was found.267
261. Id. § 18.2-357.1(B) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
262. Id. § 18.2-357.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 2015).
263. See Act of Mar. 27, 2015, ch. 690, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 9.1-902, 17.1-805, 18.2-46.1, 18.2-356, 18.2-357, 18.2-513, 19.2-215.1, 19.2-
386.35 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
264. Id.
265. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-357 (Repl. Vol. 2014 & Cum. Supp. 2015).
266. Act of Mar. 26, 2015, ch. 632, 2015 Va. Acts -, - (codified as amended at VA.
CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-244, -247 (Cum. Supp. 2015)).
267. Id.
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